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THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF CROSS-LISTING ABROAD 
FOR IRISH FIRMS' 
Thomas G .  O'Comor 
Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
ABSTRACT 
The number of Irishfirms cross-listed on international exchanges remains low, 
relative to other countries. However, as a proportion of those firms eligible to 
list, Irish firms are, relative to others, more likely to list abroad. Surprisingly, 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) show that in 1997 US exchange-traded Irish 
firms are worth less than domestic Irish firms, a result at odds with what we 
might have expected and with the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis. 
In this paper, I show that listing abroad, in both London (AIM listing only) 
and the US (both Level 1 and Level 21, does enhance the value of lrishfirms. I 
jnd that cross-listing leads to an average 'within-firm' change in the value of 
Level 2 firms in the region of 19.65 per cent (using market-to-book of assets). 
As expected, the change in value experienced by h e 1  1 firms is smaller (14.93 
per cent). Like Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009), 1 do notfind that an ordinary 
listing in London enhances value. Surprisingly, Ifind that Irish firms that 
trade on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London experience the 
largest valuation gains from listing abroad of all cross-listed Irish firms (27.35 
per cent using market-to-book of assets). This is surprising since these firms 
are subjected to the least onerous governance and regulatory requirements of 
all cross-listed Irishfirms. Ultimately, due to data restrictions, I am unable to 
delvefurther into why the less regulated AIMfims enjoy a larger cross-listing 
premium relative to Level 2f ims.  However, I ofer some possible explanations 
consistent with somefindings in the international cross-listing literature. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, the United States became the most attractive location for an 
international listing of a firm's equity.' While the trends were impressive, 
* This paper is based on a revised version of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. thesis at National 
University of  Ireland, Maynooth. 
Doidge et al. (2004) quote that of those non-US firms eligible to list in the US, only 
one in ten actually do so. (Claessens and Schmukler (2007) characterise those 
firms that list abroad, Barzuza (2005) and Barzuza, Smith and Valladares (2006) 
outline theoretical arguments (with empirical support) as to why others do not.) 
In contrast, of the number of Irish firms that are eligible to list in the US, a sizable 
majority does so. Thus it appears that Irish firms view an international listing in 
the US as potentially valuable for the firm. (In their survey of European corporate 
managers, Bancel and Mittoo (2001) report that 60 per cent view a foreign listing 
as potentially beneficial.) Surprisingly, in their study on the valuation effects of 
listing in the US, Doidge et al. (2004, Table 1, p. 219) document that cross-listed 
Irish firms (Level 2/3 issues to be specific) are worth in the region of 5 per cent 
less than their counterpart domestic firms2 in 1997, a result at odds with the pre- 
dictions of the legal bonding hypothesis? and ultimately with the findings of 
Doidge et al. (2004). They find that Level 2 and 3 firms enjoy a cross-listing 
premium of 37 per cent relative to non-cross-listed firms.4 In this paper I examine 
this issue further. 
I begin by forming a panel of Irish firms that cross-list, either on the London 
Stock Exchange or on US exchanges, over the period from 1986 to 2007. A priori, 
I would expect that the greatest gains to listing abroad should accrue to Level 2 
and 3 traded Irish firms. This line of reasoning is based on extending the theoret- 
ical model outlined by Doidge et al. (2004).5 Since the 'cross-listing premium' (i.e. 
the valuation difference between cross-listed and non-cross-listed finns) is 
increasing in the 'host' level of investor protection, the greatest gains to listing 
abroad should accrue to firms that list on an exchange where the governance and 
regulatory requirements are most stringent (relative to the governance and regu- 
latory requirements faced by other firms from the same country that list abroad 
on other exchanges). Since the Irish Stock Exchange adopts the UKLA's (United 
Kingdom Listing Authority) Listing Rules (with some' exceptions and modifica- 
tions), which are the rules that apply to firms listing on the London Stock 
Exchange (with many exemptions for non-UK firms), this suggests that the great- 
est gains to listing abroad should accrue to Irish firms that list on organised US 
exchanges as Level 2 and/or 3 American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
Using a series of pooled and firm-fixed-effects regressions and proxying for 
firm value using Tobin's q (see below) and market-to-book of assets, my results 
suggest that Irish cross-listed firms are worth considerably more than non- 
cross-listed firms (what is commonly referred to as a valuation premium), and 
cross-listing tends to contribute to this valuation premium (what Doidge et al. 
(2004) call a cross-listing premium). Irish cross-listed firms tend to enjoy a 'valua- 
tion premiumf over non-cross-listed firms, which range from 5.32 to 69.32 per cent 
(and is greatest for AIM-traded firms). The results from firm-fixed-effects 
regressions suggest that cross-listing abroad is associated with average 'within- 
firm' changes in value, which range from 1.90 per cent for Level 1 firms (see 
below) to a high of 21.61 per cent for AIM-listed firms. Level 2 firms tend to experience 
average 'within-firm' changes in value in the region of 7.29 per cent (19.65 per cent 
using market-to-book of assets). My results then suggest that in contrast to the 
results presented in Doidge et al. (2004), Irish Level 2 firms tend to enjoy a 
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The Valuation Effects of Cross-Listing Abroad for Irish Firms I 
cross-listing premium. However, these firms still tend to underperfom the average 
Level 2/3 cross-list (see Doidge et al., 2004,2009). This result highlights the impor- 
tance of examining the valuation effects of listing over time and not in any one 
specific year. Finally, while I find that listing on the main market of the London 
Stock Exchange does not lead to a 'cross-listing premium' for Irish firms, it does 
not destroy value, as is the case for the average foreign firm listing in London (see 
Doidge et al., 2009).6 
My paper also contributes to the recent literature, which examines the valuation 
effects of cross-listing both within and across different international equity mar- 
kets. While the Doidge et al. (2004) model of cross-listing implies that the 
cross-listing premium is increasing in the host level of investor protection (see 
endnote 5), the subsequent literature, which examines this hypothesis empirically, 
is mixed. While Clarkson, Nowland and Ragunathan (2006) and Bianconi and Tan 
(2007) support the theoretical predictions of the model, more recent studies have 
questioned these findings. First, Hope, Kang and Zang (2007) find that exchange- 
traded ADRs from emerging market countries enjoy a cross-listing premium, but 
in contrast to the predictions of the Doidge et al. (2004) model, the cross-listing 
premium is greatest for developed market firms. While their paper does not 
examine the valuation effects of cross-listing across markets, nevertheless their 
results do suggest that the cross-listing premium may not necessarily increase in 
investor protection. Second, Doidge et al. (2009) refute the findings of Bianconi 
and Tan (2007). Unlike them, Doidge et al. (2009) find that while the cross-listing 
premium is increasing in the host level of investor protection 'within-host 
country' (i.e. Level 2 and 3 ADRs enjoy the largest cross-listing premium, fol- 
lowed by Level 1 over-the-counter issues; Rule 144a firms (see below) do not enjoy 
a cross-listing premium), they do not find that this relation holds 'across coun- 
tries' (i.e. Level 2 and 3 firms enjoy a cross-listing premium, while or* and 
depositary receipt listings in the UK do not). My results are, in part, consistent 
with the findings of Doidge et al. (2009). Like them, I find that cross-listing on the 
main market of the London Stock Exchange does not contribute to their 'valuation 
premia' over non-cross-listed firms. Surprisingly, listing on the less-regulated 
AIM market is associated with a 'cross-listing premium'. Doidge et al. (2009) are 
unable to examine the valuation gains to listing on London's AIM market since 
their sample period ends in 2005. Second, and unlike them, I don't find that the 
greatest gains to listing abroad accrue to Level 2 lists in the US. While I do docu- 
ment a statistically sigruficant cross;listing premium for these firms, the premium 
is smaller than the cross-listing premia experienced by AIM-traded firms. The fact 
that AIM-traded firms enjoy the largest gains from listing abroad suggests that the 
valuation gains from listing abroad do not necessarily increase in investor protec- 
tion across different host markets in the manner predicted by the legal bonding 
Ultimately, due to data restrictions, I am unable to delve further into why the 
cross-listing premium for Level 2 firms is smaller than the premium experienced 
by AIM-listed firms in London. Thus, I can only conjecture that my results may be 
a result of the following. First, and perhaps consistent with Sarkissian and Schill 
(2009), the small cross-listing premium experienced by Level 2 firms (relative to 
AIM and the average Level 2 or 3 list) is due in part to the fact that listing in the 
US is not their first cross-listing? Sarkissian and Schill(2009) show that the great- 
est gains from listing abroad for firms with multiple international listings stem 
from their initial cross-listing. Second, in the case of AIM-traded firms, I hypoth- 
esize that the cross-listing premium is a function of several factors: recent 
evidence suggests that the cross-listing premium is a fqnction of both the costs of 
initial listing (and the costs of ongoing governance and reporting requirements) 
and the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities externally. The 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) has proved to be highly successful in pro- 
viding small (young) firms with a low-cost platform to facilitate their ongoing 
growth and expansion. Finally, given the ability of lrish listed firms to raise siz- 
able amounts of capital on the AIM, this also suggests that the low level of 
governance and reporting obligations required of these firms may not be as 
important, since agency costs in these firrns are likely to be low. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I outline the listing and 
reporting requirements of firms that cross-list in either the UK or the US. The data 
is outlined in Section 3. In Section 4, 1 present the empirical results. Section 5 
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CROSS-LISTING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In this section I outline how firrns can cross-list in the United States (US) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). A non-US firm can list in the US, either as an ordinary list, 
or through a depositq receipt programme. There exist four distinct Amercian 
depositary receipt types, differing in terms of their trading locale and, more 
importantly, their ongoing disclosure and regulatory requirements. They are a 
Level 1 over-the-counter issue, a Level 2 and capital-raising Level 3 exchange- 
traded depositary receipt, and finally a private placement on Portal under 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 144a. 
A Level 1 issue is the simplest and cheapest way for non-US firms to access 
US and non-US capital markets. They trade over-the-counter and also on some 
exchanges outside of the US. Unlike Level 2 and 3 programmes, Level 1 firms are 
not obliged to reconcile their accounting procedures to US GAAP (Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practices) or to file periodic reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. They require minimal SEC registration and are exempt 
from the SECs reporting and accounting obligations under Rule 12g3-2@). They 
provide instead an English translation of financial statements prepared according 
to home country accounting practices. 
Level 2 and Level 3 capital raising programmes facilitate non-US firms that 
wish to list on an organised exchange in the United States. Level 2 issues are 
sponsored (created voluntarily by the international listing firm) public deposi- 
tary receipts that do not provide for capital raising in the US. Level 3 provisions 
facilitate the issuance of new stock in the United States. Unlike Level 1 and Rule 
144A firms, a Level 2 or 3 issue obligates the firm to adhere to sizable disclosure, 
regulatory and legal requirements. Specifically, an exchange-listed issue 
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necessitates the firm to conform and adhere to US GAAP, become subject to 
greater Securities and Exchange Commission scrutiny and become subject to 
civil liability under Section 18 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. In addi- 
tion, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that CEOs (chief executive officers) 
and CFOs (chief financial officers) must personally certify that information in 
each year filed under Form 20-F is accurate and free from material misstate- 
ments and omissions, and that the financial statements and other financial 
information in the report fairly present, in all material respects, the issuer's 
financial position, results of operations and cash flows. Finally, a Level 2 or 3 
issue exposes the firm to the scrutiny of 'Reputational Intermediaries'. These 
include financial analysts, underwriters, bond rating agencies, auditors and 
institutional investors. 
A Rule 144A depositary receipt programme facilitates access to US and non- 
US markets through a private placement of sponsored depositary receipts to 
Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs). Like Level 1 issues, they do not require 
compliance with US GAAP or SEC registration. Under Regulation S, a company 
can offer a depositary receipt programme to non-US investors. It is not uncom- 
mon for firms to establish a Level 1 ADR in connection with a Rule 144A 
programme. 
Firms can cross-list in London, either on the main market as a depositary 
receipt (DR) or ordinary issue or on the less regulated Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM). Like US lists, the different listing options require varying degrees 
of disclosure and regulation. Specifically, an ordinary listing on the London Stock 
Exchange requires clearance by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA). However, 
since the vast majority of firms that cross-list in the UK are not incorporated in the 
UK, the listing rules that seek to protect minority shareholders do not apply to 
these firms. Specifically, the combined code on corporate governance, adopted 
after the Cadbury Report in 1992 and the Hampel Report in 1998, do not apply to 
firms not incorporated in the UK. However, given the historical ties between the 
Irish and London Stock Exchanges, the case is different for Irish firms. The Irish 
Stock Exchange (formerly the Dublin Stock Exchange) was, until 1995, part of the 
privately run and regulated International Stock Exchange, whose most visible 
trading location was in London. Prior to 1973, the Dublin (Irish) Stock Exchange 
was one of the provincial arms of the London Stock Exchange, and from 1973 it, 
unlike others, retained an independent role, when others such as Manchester and 
Glasgow were absorbed fully into the London Stock Exchange. Prior to becoming 
independent of the London Stock Exchange, Irish firms could choose a Dublin- 
only or a joint listing in both Dublin and Lqndon. A number of the older Irish 
firms, such as Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Lrish Bank, Bank of Ireland and CRH 
(Cement Roadstone Holdings) decided on a joint listing. For example, Anglo Irish 
Bank listed simultaneously in both Dublin and London on 22 February 1974. (See 
Table 1 for the exact listing dates.) Since 1995 the Irish Stock Exchange has oper- 
ated independently of the London Stock Exchange. However, given the origins of 
the Irish Stock Exchange, it continues to adopt the UKLA Listing Rules, with some 
exceptions in its 'green pages'. Furthermore, firms listed on the Irish Stock 
Exchange (ISE) are required to disclose a statement of compliance with the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance in their annual report. Thus, as a 
result, a cross-listing on the London Stock Exchange is not associated with any 
substantive governance improvements for Irish firms. 
Typically, non-UK firms trading as an ordinary list on the main market of the 
London Stock Exchange are, similar to US Level 2 and 3 issues, required to file 
financial information prepared in atccordance with UK or US GAAP or 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). However, exceptions are made, pro- 
vided the UKLA deem the existing standards 'protect investors' interests'. For 
example, the UKLA accept local accounting standards from Japanese firms. The 
requirements for firms that list on the main market via DRs are even less demand- 
ing than those for ordinary listings, in that financial information need not be 
prepared in accordance with IAS or UK or US GAAP. In this regard, a depositary 
receipt listing in London is similar to a Level 1 or Rule 144a type depositary 
receipt listing in the US, in terms of reporting and continuing obligations. All Irish 
firms trade on the main market as ordinary issues. 
Finally, a firm can list on the London Stock Exchange on the Alternative 
Investment Market (AM). Typically, the listing requirements on the AIM are min- 
imal. For example, there is no prior trading requirement, no prior shareholder 
approval for transactions is required and admission documents are not pre- 
vetted by the Exchange or by the UKLA. Furthermore, there is no minimum market 
capitalisation and there is no minimum public float requirement. All that is 
required for a firm to be admitted to AIM is that it has the support of a nominated 
advisor ('Nomad') and subsequently the firm has to satisfy only the Exchange's 
weak disclosure duty. 
DATA 
I begin this study by sourcing an initial sample of Irish firms, both active and 
inactive (formerly dead stocks list on Worldscope), from Worldscope that were 
publicly listed in any year from 1980 to 2007. Worldscope is a financial database, 
provided by Thompson Reuters, which includes historical information on over 
43,000 global public firms. These firms are drawn from more than 60 developed 
and emerging market countries. This initial sample is made up of 90 firms. From 
this initial list, I idenbfy Irish firms that are cross-listed internationally using data 
from the London Stock Exchange (www.1ondonstockexchange.com) for United 
Kingdom lists, and the Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com), Deutsche Bank 
(www.adr.db.com), JP Morgan (www.adr.com), the New York Stock Exchange 
(www.nyse.com) and NASDAQ (www.nasdaq.com) for Irish firms cross-listed in 
the United States. For Irish firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, 1 classify 
firms either as having an ordinary listing on the main market or as having a list- 
ing on the less regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM). For firms listed in 
the US, I identrfy the initial listing date in the US and the depositary receipt type. 
In the case of firms with more than one depositary receipt programme (e.g. Allied 
Irish Bank) or firms that transfer from one depositary receipt level to another, 
I classlfy firms in accordance with their first listing (in the US) and ignore 
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any subsequent changes. This is a standard approach taken in the literature. To be 
included in the final sample, firms must meet a minimum data requirement. Firms 
that are cross-listed at some point in the sample are required to have financial data 
available at least one year before and one year after the year in which they initially 
cross-listed. Furthermore, all firms with two or fewer observations are eliminated 
from the study. Irish finns also traded on Germany's Neuer Market. For example, 
both Conduit and Trinity Biotech traded on the Neuer Market prior to its aboli- 
tion. However, both firms are excluded from my analysis since they do not meet 
the minimum data requirements. Finally, I exclude all non-cross-listed financial 
firrns, but, contrary to other studies, I do not exclude cross-listed financial firms. If 
I were to do so, I would lose three Irish banking firms listed in the US. Given the 
small size of my sample, it makes more sense to retain these After impos- 
ing these minimum data requirements, the final sample is made up of 17 firms 
cross-listed in the United Kingdom, 10 firms cross-listed in the United States and 
36 domestic firms. The sample of cross-listed firms is presented in Table 1. Panel 
A contains Irish firms listed in the United States. These finns are also listed on the 
London Stock Exchange but, due to data availability, I am only able to examine 
the valuation effects of listing in the US for these firms. Panel B contains Irish 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange but not listed in the US. 
For each cross-listed firm, I present the date on which the firm initially listed 
on the Irish Stock Exchange (data is sourced from Irish Stock Exchange Annuals), 
the date and type of American Depositary Receipt level, and finally the date 
and type of UK list. Of the sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
nine are listed as ordinary shares on the main market and five are listed on the 
AIM. Minrnet also trade over-the-counter on the Norwegian Norges 
Fondsmeglerforbund (NOTC) and on the Berlin Borse, but is included as an AIM- 
traded firm in my final sample since this was their initial international 
cross-listing. In keeping with the standard convention in the literature, I identdy 
a firm's initial cross-listing and ignore subsequent listings (unless the firm cross- 
delists). No Irish firm trades as a depositary receipt on the London Stock 
Exchange. Irish firms that trade in the US do so either as a Level 1 over-the- 
counter depositary receipt or as a Level 2 exchange-traded depositary receipt. 
Level 1 American Depositary Receipts trade as pink sheet issues over-the-counter 
on NASDAQ. In contrast, Level 2 (and Level 3) American Depositary Receipts 
trade on organised US exchanges (and NASDAQ). Irish firrns also trade in the US 
as private placements under Rule 144a on Portal, but are excluded from our final 
sample as they fail to meet the minimum data requirements. 
Before I proceed to the next section, a number of points evident from Table 1 
are worth noting. First, all of the Irish firms cross-listed in the US do so after hav- 
ing initially listed on the London Stock Exchange. For example, Bank of Ireland 
and Allied Irish Bank listed in London in 1959 and 1967 respectively. Allied Irish 
Bank's initial listing in the US was ~IJ 1990. However, because Worldscope cover- 
age of Irish firms only begins in 1980, I cannot examine the valuation effects of 
listing in the UK for these firrns. In addition, Sarkissian and ScMl (2009) show in 
their study of firms that have multiple lists on international exchanges that their 
initial (international) list is associated with the greatest valuation gains. 
o'comor 
TABLE I: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
In thls table. I outline the sample of cross-listed lrish f i rd.  For each firm listed in e~ther London (BE) or In the 
United States (ADR). I present the year of (initial) listing on the lrish Stock Exchange (Irish Listing), US cross- 
listing level (ADR), date of US listing (ADR List), type of LSE listing (LSE) and date of London listing (LSE L~st). 
All data are sourced from the lrish Stock Exchange. London Stock Exchange, NASDAQ. New York Stock 
Exchange, Citibank, JP Morgan and the Bank of New York. 
Irish Listing ADR ADR List LSE 
US-Listed lrish Firms 
Allied Irish Bank 261061 1967 Level 2 0 11 1 11 1990 Main Market 291061 1967 
Allied Irish Bank 144AlREG S 241041 1 998 
Anglo Irish Bank 22/02/ 1974 Level I 0 111 01 1994 Main Market 221021 1974 
Arcon International August 1980 Level I 261081 1 998 Main Market 031041 1995 
Bank of Ireland 1410 11 1959 Level 2 0111111995 MainMarket 1410111959 
05102/ 1973 Level 2 231071 1986 Main Market 05102/ 1973 
0 1/03/1988 Level I 251091 1 998 Main Market 081091 1988 
Greencore Group 0110 11 199 1 Level I 261041 1 999 Main Market 2610411 99 1 
Horizon Technology 061 12/1999 Level I 2004 Main Market 061 1 2/ 1999 
011 1011 986 Level I 2004 Main Market 1 9/04 1990 
Waterford 
January 1967 Level 2 2810 111 987 Main Market 0 111 11986 
London-Listed Irish Firms 
1810511973 - 
0110111978 - - Main Market 3 11051 1996 
0110111989 Level 3 2610111984 Main Market 1811 111993 
FBD Holdings 0110111970 - - Main Market 041051 1 995 
01/02/1981 - - Main Market 141091 1987 
0110111988 - - Main Market 2510611 992 
28/12/1996 - - Main Market 17/07/2000 
Main Market 08/06/1995 
Mclnerney Holdings 0 111 111971 - - Main Market 0610 111 997 
12/04/1988 - 
0110311986 - 
Petroceltic 29/07/1994 - 
Providence Resources 091091 1997 
Main Market 05/03/1992 
'Minmet also trades over-the-counter on the Norwegian Norges Fondsmeglerforbund (NOTC) and on the 
Berlin Borse. 
Consequently, if these results hold for Irish firms (which I cannot show), my 
empirical analysis, presented in the next section, suggests that listing in the US for 
these firms may not be as value-enhancing relative to firms that list initially 
in the US. 
To measure firm value, I follow Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) and Hope et al. 
(2007) and employ Tobin's q. Mitton and O'Connor (2008) also use Tobin's q to 
The Valuation Effects of Goss-Listing Abroad for Irish Finns 
proxy for value in their study of the relationship between investability (finns that 
become open to foreign ownership) and firm value. Tobin's q is defined as the 
book value of debt plus market capitalisation divided by the book value of assets. 
Ultimately, like others, my definition of Tobin's q deviates from the original defi- 
nition by proxying for the market value of debt using its book value counterpart 
and measuring the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. For 
robustness' sake, I also use market-to-book of assets and Relative 9. Like Gozzi, 
Levine and Schmukler (2008), I calculate Relative q as the value of each intema- 
tional firm divided by the average value of all domestic Irish finns. 
I control for firm- and industry-related factors commonly employed in other 
studies using Tobin's 9 (see Doidge et al., 2004,2009, Gozzi et al., 2008; Mitton and 
CYConnor, 2008). I use the average (geometric) sales growth (inflation-adjusted) 
over the last two years and global industry q to control for firm and industry 
growth respectively. Based on primary standard industry classifications, (the 
yearly) mean global industry 9 is calculated as the average 9 of all firms (Irish and 
international) within that classification? I use log of sales (inflation-adjusted and 
in euros), rather than total assets (given the definition of Tobin's 9) to control for 
firm sue. Like King and Segal (2008), I also control for firm leverage and prof- 
itability. Leverage is calculated as total debt to assets, and profitability as earnings 
before interest and taxation to total assets. Tobin's 9 (and other proxies for firm 
value), sales growth, firm sue, leverage and profitability are Winsorized at the 1 
and 99 per cent tails of the distribution to remove the confounding effects of 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the main results on cross-listing and firm value. First, I begin 
with univariate comparisons. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. I then 
proceed to panel regression estimates (pooled ordinary least squares and firm- 
fixed effects) of the effect of cross-listing on firm value. 
Year-by-Year Valuation Comparisons 
In Table 2, I compare the value of cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms in each 
year from 1986 to 2007. To compare the value of cross-listed firms to non-cross- 
listed firms, I do the following. For each set of cross-listed firms, I outline the 
mean value in each year. For each year, I calculate the mean (Diff) and median 
@iff*) difference in value between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms. 
Finally, for each year, I test whether the mean (and median) difference in value 
between the two groups is statistically significant using a t-test (z-test for medi- 
ans). The final row of Table 2 contains the same calculations for the entire 
be worth more than non-cross-listed firms. Specifically, using the mean difference 
O'Connor 
TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF CROSS-LISTEDTO NON-CROSS-LISTED 
FIRMS IN CALENDARTIME 
9 The table outlines the average value of cross-listed firms in calendar time.Value is proxied using 
Tobin's q. Tobin's q is measured as ((book value of debt + market capitalization)lbook value of 
assets), where book value of debt is measured as the book value of assets less the book value of 
equity. Level I and Level 2 denotes Irish firms listing in the US, either as a Level I over-the-counter 
issue or as an exchange-traded Level 2 issue. London (Ord.) and London (AIM) denote lrish firms 
listing on the London Stock Exchange either as an ordinary list on the main market or on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM).AII data is sourced from the London Stock Exchange, NAS- 
DAQ, New York Stock Exchange, Citibank, JP Morgan and the Bank of New York In the remaining 
columns, I outline the mean (Diff) and median ( D i m  difference between cross-listed and non-cross- 
listed firms in each calendar year in which firm-level data is available.The row labelled 'ALL' contains 
mean and median data for the entire sample period.Asterisks denote significance of t-tens and z- 
tests of the equality of means and medians, where". " and * indicate significance at the I per cent. 
5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
Level I Level 2 London (Ord.) London (AIM) 
Mean Diff Diff' Mean Diff Diff' Mean Diff Diff' Mean Diff Diff' 
Panel A: Culendar Time 
1986 - - - I. I9 (0.12) 0.05 2.20 0.89 1.06 - 
1987 - - - 1.75 0.56 0.65 2.29 1.10 I .20 - 
1988 - - - 1.44 0.29 0.30 1.56 0.41 0.63 - 
1989 - - - 1.26 0.00 0.17 1.45 0.1 9 0.20 - 
I990 - - - 1.42 (0.04) 0.12 1.24 (0.22) 0.06 - 
1991 - - - 2.09 0.94" 0.29 1.26 0.1 1 0.27 - 
I992 - - - 1.87 0.82" 0.20 1.21 0.1 6 0.21' - 
1993 - - - 1.43 0.07 0.09 1.66 0.30 0.01 - 
1994 - - - 1.45 0.09 0.12 1.76 0.40 0.12 - 
I995 1.02 (0.34) (0.21) 1.41 0.05 0.08 1.57 0.21 0.16 - 
I996 1-02 (0.37) (0.25) 1.47 0.08 0.06 1.91 0.52 0.24 - 
1997 1.05 (0.46) (0.35) 1.50 (0.01) (0.01) 2.18 0.67 0.28' - 
I998 1.35 (0.21) 0.05 1.42 (0.14) (0.02) 1.67 0.1 1 0.14 - 
1999 1.21 (0.05) (0.02) 1.44 0.18 0.09 1.47 0.21 0.1 1 - 
2000 1.14 (0.30) (0.04) 1.34 (0.10) 0.13 1.53 0.09 0.27 - 
2001 I .  0 0.12 1.28 0.24 0.23' I .  0.40" 0.47 - 
2002 1.45 0.44" 0.18' 1.17 0.16 0.07 1.18 0.17 0.01 1.86 0.85 0.82 
2003 1.79 0.66' 0.35 1.12 (0.01) 0.06 1-46 0.33" 0.43' 4.74 3.61 3.73 
2004 1.51 (0.01) 0.45 1.15 (0.37) (0.15) 1.90 0.38 0.34 1.89 0.37 0.67 
2005 1.49 0.28 0.48 1 .I 3 (0.08) (0.04) 2.03 0.82" 0.73" 2.23 1.02 0.09 
2006 1.42 (0.49) (0.06) 1.3 1 (0.60) (0.25) 2.19 0.28" 0.35' 2.42 0.5 1 (0.25) 
2007 1.43 0.30 0.31 1.25 0.12 0.13 1.66 0.53' 0.51 1.05 (0.08) 0.02 
ALL 1.37 0.13' 0.13" 1.40 0.16 0.06" 1.66 0.42" 0.35" 2.23 0.99" 0.18" 
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in value, Level 1 firms are worth more than domestic firms in 5 of the 13 years 
(7/13 for the median firm), 13 of the 22 years for Level 2 firms (17/22 for the 
median Level 2 firm), 21 of the 22 years for firms listed as ordinary shares on the 
main market of the London Stock Exchange (all 22 years for the median firm) and 
in all 6 years for the mean AIM firm (5 of the 6 for the median firm). Consistent 
with Doidge et al. (2004), exchange-traded Irish firms were worth less than their 
domestic counterparts in 1997. The mean (median) vduation differences are 
statistically sigruficant in 2 (1) years, 2 (1) years, 6 (5) years, and 0 (0) years for 
Level 1, Level 2, London (ordinaries) and London (AIM) firms respectively. 
Over the entire sample period, cross-listed firms, irrespective of the listing 
type, tend to be worth more than domestic, non-cross-listed firms. The average 
(median) Level 1 firm has a valuation premium of 0.13 (0.13) relative to non-cross- 
listed firms. The valuation premium for the average (and median) Level 2 firm is 
0.16 (0.06). Interestingly, firms listed in London (both ordinary and AIM lists) 
experienced the greatest valuation premia. The average (median) valuation pre- 
mium for ordinary London lists is 0.42 (0.35 for the median firm). For AIM-traded 
firms, the average valuation premium rises to 0.99 (the valuation premium for the 
median firrn is 0.18). Although the evidence in Table 1 suggests that cross-listing 
is associated with higher firm values, the results should be interpreted with cau- 
tion given that these univariate comparisons do not control for other factors that 
are likely to influence firm value ( eg .  size, profitability, sales and industry 
growth, and leverage). I control for these factors in Section 5. 
Even-Time Valuation Comparisons 
Table 3 compares the value of cross-listed to nonaosslisted firms, not in calendar 
time but in event time. This analysis is designed to examine whether there is a sig- 
nificant change in value once the firms cross-list (possibly resulting in a 
cross-listing premium), or if valuation premia (which we document in Table 2) 
exist prior to firms cross-listing. To undertake this analysis, I denote the list year 
as 'O, and compare cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms for the five years before 
to five years after listing. For each cross-listed sample of firms, I calculate the 
mean (or median) abnormal value of cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed 
firms in each event year. Abnormal value is calculated as the value of each cross- 
listed firrn in each year less the mean (or median) value of non-cross-listed firms 
in the same year. In the remaining column, I calculate the Relative q of cross-listed 
firms in each event year. 
Table 3 suggests that for both Level 1 and Level 2 US lists value tends to 
increase in the run-up to listing and falls off thereafter. The value of Level 1 and 
Level 2 firms appear to peak around the time of listing, but falls off thereafter, i.e. 
the mean (median) Level 1 firm is worth, relative to non-cross-listed firms, the 
most in the year immediately prior to listing. Level 2 firms tend to document a 
similar trend, and, interestingly, Level 2 firms (mean and median) tend to be 
worth less than non-crossqisted firms in almost all event time years. Level 1 firms 
only tend to be worth more than non-cross-hsted firms in the years immediately 
TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF CROSS-LISTED TO NON-CROSS-LISTED FIRMS IN EVENTTIME 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal value of cross-listed firms relative to  non-cross-listed firms in event time.The event window is 
defined as a seven-year period around the event year (i.e.Year 0 is the cross-listing year). Abnormal value is calculated as the mean (or median) of the 
value of cross-listed firms less the mean (or median) of non-cross-listed firms in the same year.Also reported is the mean-adjusted Relative q, where 
Relative q is calculated as the value of each cross-listed firm divided by the average value of all non-cross-listed firms in each year,Asterisks denote sig- 
nificance of t-tests and z-tests of the equality of means and medians, where *, * and * indicate significance at the I per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent levels respectively. 
Level I Level 2 London (Ord.) London (AIM) 
Mean Median Rel. Mean Median Rel. Mean Median Rel. Mean Median Rel. 
Ab. Ab. 4 Ab. Ab. 4 Ab. Ab. 4 Ab. Ab. 4 
-3 0.00 (0.08) 1.15 (0.46)" (0.24)" 0.93 0.09 0.08 1.22 (0.42)" (0.26) 0.96 
-2 0.0 1 0.14 1.15 (0.34) (0.23) 0.93 0.39 0.14' 1.39 (0.38) (0.22) 0.97 
-I 0.25- 0.45" 1.24 (0.12) (0.23) 1.04 0.19 0.10 1.31 0.49 0.6 1 1.31 
0 0.15 0.31' 1.05 0.01 (0.13) 1.13 0.08 0.13 1.14 0.47 (0.03) 1.59 
I (0.07) 0.02 1.05 (0.18) (0.18) 0.98 0.22 0.18 1.22 0.84 (0.1 0) 1.74 
2 (0.1 9)' (0.08) 0.93 (0.27)" (0.15) 0.9 1 0.14 . (0.01) 1.14 (0.06) 0.06 1.20 
3 (0.24)" (0.08) 1.05 (0.26)" (0.14) 0.88 0.2 1 0.02 I .21 1.58 1.74 2.64 
Before 0.14 0.08 I .22 (0.41) (0.28) 0.96 0.14 0.02 1.27 (0.24) (0.23) 0.93 
After 0.13 0.13 1.1 I 0.16 0.06 1.1 1 0.42 0.35 1.29 0.99 0.1 8 1.80 
Diff (0.01)' 0.05" ( 0  I )  0.57 0.34" 0.16 0.28" 0.33" 0.02" 1.23- 0.41" 0.87" 
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surrounding listing, apparently as a consequence of the increased value that they 
experience immediately prior to listing. The time-series behaviour of value for 
Level 1 and Level 2 lists suggests that Irish firms that cross-list in the US appear 
to 'time' their decision to list internationally. In contrast, firms that cross-list on 
the London Stock Exchange do not appear to time their listing internati~nally.'~ 
For both sets of firms, there does not appear to be a run-up in value prior to list- 
ing in the UK. For the average firm listing in the UK as an ordinary list, value 
(using Tobin's q) tends to increase after listing, and remains higher than the value 
on the list date in each post-listing year." Finally, the average (and median) AIM 
list appears to perform similarly to the median ordinary list: value tends to 
increase once they trade in London, but begins to fall off thereafter. 
I supplement Table 3 with a graphical depiction of firm value for cross-listed 
firms in event time as depicted in Figure 1. I present graphs for both Tobin's q and 
market-to-book of assets. Figure 1 again suggests that for Level 1 and Level 2 
firms value tends to peak around the time of listing and falls off thereafter?2 
London lists (ordinary (median) and AIM (average and median)) tend to experi- 
ence an immediate appreciation in value once they list, subsequently followed by 
a fall-off. The time-series behaviour of value for Irish Level 1 and Level 2 firms is 
consistent with the time-series patterns of Tobin's q for firms that intemationalise 
as reported by Gozzi et al. (2008), firms that cross-list as reported by Doidge et al. 
(2009) and King and Segal (2008), and for firms that become investable, as 
reported by Mitton and O'Connor (2008).13 I supplement this analysis by follow- 
ing King and Segal (2008) and also proxy for firm value using price-to-earnings 
(PE) and enterprise value to EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxation, 
depreciation and amortization). The time-series behaviour of both valuation met- 
r i c ~  around the time of cross-listing is presented graphically for each set of 
cross-listing firms in Figure 2. In general the trends are similar to those depicted 
by Tobin's q and the market-to-book of assets. 
In the remaining columns of Table 3, I outline the value of cross-listed firms 
relative to the average non-cross-listed firms in event time. In general, the analy- 
sis using Relative q suggests that the change in value experienced by cross-listed 
firms around the time of listing is experienced by the cross-listing firm alone. For 
example, in line with the average (and median) absolute value of Level 1 and 
Level 2 firms, mean-adjusted Relative q experiences an appreciation prior to list- 
ing, followed by depreciation thereafter. Finally, and more revealing, is the fact 
that cross-listed firms tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed firms even 
prior to becoming cross-listed. Level 1 and London ordinary finns are worth more 
than non-cross-listed firms in every pre-listing period. Level 2 firms are only 
worth more than non-cross-listed firms in the years immediately around the time 
of listing (as a result of the appreciation in value that they experience around the 
time of listing). AIM firms become more valuable than nonaoss-listed firms one 
year prior to listing, and remain more valuable thereafter. The fact that cross- 
listed firms tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed firms suggests that 
cross-listing may not have a causal effect on firm value. In Section 5, I seek to 
establish the causal effect of listing on firm value using a series of pooled and 
firm-fixed-effects regressions. 
FIGURE I: VALUE OF CROSS-LISTED FIRMS IN EVENT TIME (USING TOBIN'S Q AND 
MARKET-TO-BOOK OF ASSETS) 
Mean and Median Value (Tobin's q) of Level 1 Firms Mean and Median Value (Market-to-Book of Assets) of Level 1 Firms 
I 4 . 5 1 1  
-3 -2 -1 a 1 2 3 
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FIGURE 2: VALUE OF CROSS-LISTED FIRMS IN EVENT TIME (USING PRICE-TO-EARNINGS AND 
ENTERPRISEVALUE TO EBITDA) 
I -+- Mean +Median I 1 -+- Mean + Median I 
Mean and Median Value (Price-to-Earnings) of Level 2 Firms Mean and Median Value (Enterprise Value-to-EBITDA) of Level 2 Firms 
1 -+- Mean +Median ] 
FIGURE 2: CONTINUED 
Mean and Median 'Iue (Price-tOoEamings) of ~0~~ (Oldhaw) Firms Mean and Median Value ( ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ & ~  YaluetoEB,TDA) of London 
(Ordinary) Firms 
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The last three rows of Table 3 summarise the value of crosq$sted firms relative 
to non-mss-listed firms in the pre- and post-listing periods. On a mean- and median- 
adjusted basis, Level 2 and both sets of London-listed firms tend to worth more than 
nonuoss-listed firms, on both an absolute basis (see Relative q) and also relative to 
the pre-listing period. In turn, the mean and median differences tend to be statistically 
sigruficant (with the exception of the mean Level 2 firm). In contrast, Level 1 firms 
tend to be worth less, on an absolute (mean firm) and relative basis. However, we 
should be cautious in interpreting these figures. While the differences are statistically 
insigdicant, the changes in value may well be driven by factors other than cross- 
listing. In the next section I control for these other factors. Level 1 firms tend to be 
worth less, although the average and median differences are statistically insigruficant. 
Regression Estimates 
In this section I examine the relationship between cross-listing and firm value, 
conditional on firm and industry controls. Specifically, I estimate the following 
panel (pooled ordinary least squares) regression: 
q, =a+ p,l-I, + P2L2, +P,London(Ord),+fl ,London(AIM),+ p, X,+ (I) 
Where qit is Tobin's q, LIk,L2,,London(0rd),,London(AIM), are standard 011 dummy 
variables that correspond to listing over-the-counter as a Level 1 issue, Level 2 
exchange-traded depositary receipt, a direct 'ordmary' list, or an Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) listing on the London Stock Exchange. Each dummy 
variable is 1 on the year of listing, and 1 thereafter. Year, are year-specific time- 
fixed effects and X, are firm and industry control variables (size, profitability, 
leverage, and firm and industry growth) that influence firm value. These variables 
were defined in Section 3. 
The coefficient estimates corresponding to Equation (1) are presented in Table 
4. Below each coefficient estimate, I present t-statistics (absolute value) in square 
brackets which are calculated using standard errors clustered at the level of the 
firm. Clustered standard errors are, by construction, also robust to heteroscedas- 
ticity (see Petersen, 2009; Rogers, 1993). Finally, given the small sample size, I 
bootstrap the standard errors. Bootstrapping is based on building a sampling dis- 
tribution for a statistic by resampling from the data at hand. Given the panel 
nature of my data, each replication is a bootstrap sample of firm clusters (instead 
of individual firm-year observations) (see Petersen (2009) and Cameron, Gelbach 
and Miller (2007) for a discussion of the relevant issues). The bootstrapped stan- 
dard errors are generated using 200 replications. Efron and Tibshirani (1986) 
suggest that for bootstrapped standard errors, 50-200 replications are sufficient. 
In column 1 of Table 4, I regress Tobin's q on the cross-listing dummies alone, 
with time (year) fixed effects included. The coefficient estimates suggest that 
cross-listing firms tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed firms. Level 1, 
Level 2, London (Ord.) and London (AIM) have on average a Tobin's q that is 
0.086, 0.066, 0.360 and 0.867 higher than non-cross-listed firms, respectively. 
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TABLE 4: REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following pooled ordinary least squares regression: 
q,, = a+p,Lwel I,, +P,Level2,, +P,London(Ord), +$,London(AlM),, + P,X,,+  year,+^,, 
A full set of year-fixed effects are included but not reported. Firm value is measured usingTobinf 
q. Level I and Level 2 are dummy variables corresponding to a firm's listing in the US. London (Ord.) 
and London (AIM) are dummy variables corresponding to a firm's listing on the London Stock 
Exchange either as an ordinary list on the main market or on the Alternative Investment Market 
cross- (AIM). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real US dollars. Firm growth is measured 
as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global industry q is cal- 
culated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total 
debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as Earnings Before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) to  
Total Assets. I report t-statistics (absolute value) in square brackets.The t-statistics are calculated 
using bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications),whereby each replication is a bootstrap sam- 
ple of firm clusters (given the panel nature of the data). # Obs. is the number of observations and 
R2 is the R-Squared. Statistical significance is denoted by ". " and 'for the 1,s and 10 per cent lev- 
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[0.86] [I .03] 10.881 [ I  .3 I] [0.70] 
0.1 16 0.109 0.237- 0.184" 0.207" 
[0.8-I] [1.45] [I .38] [2.63] [2.04] 
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However, these 'valuation premia' are only statistically sigruficant for both sets of 
London-listed Irish firms. In the remaining columns of Table 4 I sequentially aug- 
ment the specification employed in column 1 with firm and industry controls. 
Column 6 contains the results where all firm and industry controls are included. 
I find that while the inclusion of firm and industry controls reduces the coef- 
ficient estimate on the AIM dummy, they fail to reduce the statistical si@cance 
on both the London (Ord.) and London (AIM) dummy variables. In all six speci- 
fications, the coefficient estimates on the London (Ord.) and London (AIM) 
dummy variables remain large and statistically sigruficant. I find that once I con- 
trol for firm and industry controls, in line with the analysis presented in Table 2, 
Level 2 firms tend to be worth more than noncross-listed firms. In contrast, Level 
1 firms tend to be valued on a par with domestic firms. Finally, in all specifications 
the firm and industry controls are of the correct sign, and remain largely statisti- 
cally sigruficant. Finn value increases with firm and industry growth. Small, 
profitable and levered firms tend also to be worth more. 
In Table 8, I calculate the magnitude of the 'valuation premia' between aoss- 
listed and non-cross-listed firms using the coefficient estimates from Table 4. Relative 
to the overall average q of 1.24 for non-cross-listed firms, the coe£€icient estimates 
suggest that the 'valuation prernia' for London (Ord.) and London (AIM) firms range 
from 28.23 to 31.29 per cent and from 51.66 to 69.92 per cent respectively. Level 2 - 
firms enjoy an average valuation premium over non-cross-listed firms of 
- 
aoss-listed firms, bar Level 1 firms, enjoy substantial valuation premia over non- 
cross-listed firms. Furthermore, the valuation premia tend to be greatest for 
London-listed firms. However, these results do not establish a causal relationship 
between cross-listing and firm value. The positive coefficient on the cross-listing 
dummies may simple indicate that those firms that cross-list are those firms with 
already higher valuations, i.e. those firms that cross-list self-select, as opposed to 
being randomly assigned into cross-listing. In fact, the Relative q statistics out- 
lined in Table 2 suggest that this is the case. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates 
could also be affected by (unobserved) heterogeneity that may not have been ade- 
quately captured in the pooled ordinary least squares regressions. To address 
these concerns, I focus on within-firm changes by re-estimating Equation (I), but 
now with firm-fixed effects included (to capture the unobserved heterogeneity). 
Consequently, I estimate the following two-way fixed effects model: 
q, =a+p,LI,, +P,L2, +~,London(Ord),+~,London(AIM),+ P,X,+ Firm, +Year, + E , ,  (2) 
Where Firm, are firm-fixed effects and all other variables are as explained in 
Equation (1). In order to estimate the causal effect of listing using firm-fixed 
effects, I must assume that the unobservables are time-invariant (and, thus, the 
inclusion of firm-fixed effects adequately controls for unobserved attributes that 
may influence firm value) and, second, that the unobservables do not have 
a causal role in precipitating aoss-listing (see Li and Prabhala, 2007 for a 
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TABLE 5: FIRM-FIXED-EFFECT ESTIMATES OFTHE IMPACT OF 
CROSS-LISTING ON THEVALUE OF IRISH FIRMS 
This table reporu coefficient estimates from the following panel data regressions with firm-fixed 
effects: 
A full set of year-fixed effects are included but not reported. Firm value is measured using Tobin's 
q. Level I and Level 2 are dummy variables corresponding t o  a firm's listing in the US. London (Ord.) 
and London (AIM) are dummy variables corresponding to  a firm's listing on the London Stock 
Exchange either as an ordinary list on the main market or  on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real US dollars. Firm growth is measured 
as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global industry q is cal- 
culated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. Firm leverage is total 
debt to total assets, and profitability is defined as Earnings Before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) to  
Total Assets. I report t-statistics (absolute value) in square brackets.The t-statistics are calculated 
using bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications), whereby each replication is a bootstrap sam- 
ple of firm clusters (pen the panel nature of the data). # Obs. is the number of observations and 
R2 is the overall R-Squared. Statistical significance is denoted by -,- and * for the 1,5 and I 0  per 
cent levels respectively. 
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discussion). Finally, in order to determine the statistical sigrufcance of the 
firm-fixed effect estimates, I bootstrap the standard errors, as before. 
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of Equation (2) with t-statistics 
(absolute), adjusted for heteroscedasticity as in White (1980), presented under 
the coefficient estimates in square brackets. In column 1, I regress Tobin's 9 on 
the cross-listing dummies alone, with firm- and time-fixed effects included. In 
subsequent columns, controls variables are added in turn. Specification (5) con- 
tains the coefficient estimates with all controls included. The primary difference 
between Tables 4 and 5 is that once we control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
the coefficient estimates on the Level 2 and London (Ord.) dummies are much 
smaller, and lose their statistical sigruficance. In contrast, the coefficient esti- 
mates on the London (AIM) dummy remains large, and maintains its statistical 
sigruficance. The coefficient estimate on the Level 1 dummy ranges from nega- 
tive to positive, but is statistically insigruficant in all specifications. These results 
suggest that cross-listing on international exchanges only causes value for Lrish 
firms that list on the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock 
Exchange. In contrast, cross-listing does not contribute to the valuation premia 
enjoyed by Level 2 and London (Ord.) lists. In summary, only AIM lists enjoy a 
'cross-listing premium'. 
In the remaining rows of Table 8, I calculate the magnitude of the 'cross-listing 
premium' for all cross-listing Irish firms. Based on the coefficient estimates pre- 
sented in Table 3, cross-listing abroad leads to k average 'within-firm' change in 
Tobin's 9 in the region of 0.03, 0.10, 0.03 and 0.48 for Level 1, Level 2 London 
(Ord.) and AIM traded firms respectively. Relative to an average Tobin's 9 of 1.37, 
1.40,1.66 and 2.33 respectively for these same firms, this implies that cross-listing 
abroad causes average 'within-firm' changes in value in the region of 1.90,7.29, 
1.88 and 21.61 per cent for Level 1, Level 2, London (Ord.) and AIM traded firms 
respectively. Of course, as outlined in Table 5, only AIM-traded firms enjoy a sta- 
tistically sigruficant cross-listing premium. 
In Table 6, I replicate the analysis undertaken in Table 5, but here I use 
market-to-book of assets in place of Tobin's 9 as the valuation metric. All control 
variables, except for global industry 9, are included, as before. In column 1, I 
regress market-to-book of assets on the cross-listing dummies alone, with firm- 
and time-fixed effects included. In the remaining columns, control variables are 
added in turn. Specification (5) contains the coefficient estimates with all controls 
included. The coefficient estimates for London (Ord.) and London (AIM) firms 
from Table 6 are in line with those presented in Table 5. Listing in London causes 
value for London (AIM) firms only. For these firms, trading on the AIM market in 
London causes an average 'within-firrn' change in value of 27.35 per cent. In con- 
trast to the results presented in Table 5, the coefficient estimates on the Level 1 and 
Level 2 dummies are positive, and statistically sigrufcant in some instances. The 
coefficient estimates imply an average cross-listing premium of 14.93 per cent for 
Level 1 firms and 19.65 per cent for Level 2 firms. 
The coefficient estimates presented in Tables 5 and 6 for Irish firms are in 
stark contrast to those presented for the entire sample of cross-listed firms 
reported by Doidge et al. (2009, see Table 9, pp. 60-61). Doidge et al. (2009) 
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The Valuation Effects of Cross-Listing Abroad for Irish Finns 
conclude that the average Level 1 cross-listed firm tends to be worth more than its 3 comterpmt non-cross-listed firm and cross-listing abroad is associated with sta- 
tistically significant 'within-firm' changes in value for these firms. Interestingly, 
while the coefficient estimates for Irish firms (pooled ordinary least squares and 
firm-fixed effects) are in line with those presented by Doidge et al. (2009) for their 
entire sample of firms, using Tobin's q, they are statistically insigruficant for Irish 
firms. Second, typically Level 2 and 3 firms enjoy the largest cross-listing premia. 
The pooled ordinary least squares and firm-fixed-effects coefficient estimates pre- 
sented by Doidge et al. (2009) are the largest for Level 2 and 3 firms (0.25 and 0.06 
respectively). In contrast, I find that AIM-traded Irish firms enjoy the largest 
cross-listing premia. Finally, while Irish firms trading on the main market of the 
London Stock Exchange do not experience a cross-listing premium, their experi- 
ence does, nevertheless, compare favourable with the average LSE (ordinary list). 
Doidge et al. (2009) highlight a 'cross-listing discount' for the average B E  (ordi- 
nary) list. Thus, Irish firms listing on the main market of the London Stock 
Exchange tend to outperform the average LSE list. This may be a reflection of the 
fact that, unlike many other non-UK firms that list in London, Irish firms adhere 
TABLE 6: FIRM-FIXED EFFECTS USING MARKETTO-BOOK OF ASSETS 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following panel data regressions with firm-fixed 
effects: 
mba,, =a+~,LwelI,,+~,Lwd2,,+~,London(O~~),,+~,Lo~do~(A~M),+~,X,+Fim, +Year,+&,, 
A full set of year-fixed effects and firm andlor industry controls are included but not reported. Firm 
value is measured using market-to-book of asser..All other variables included are as defined in 
Table 4.1 report t-statistics (absolute value) in square brackets.The t-statistics are calculated using 
booutrapped standard errors (200 replications), whereby each replication is  a boomrap sample of 
firm clusters (given the panel nature of the data). # Obs. is the number of observations and R' is 
the overall R-Squared. Statistical significance is denoted by -. " and ' for the 1.5 and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Level I 0.503' 0.5 14" 0.423 0.420 0.409 
[I .93] [ 1.981 [I .59] [I .58] [I .56] 
Level 2 0.500' 0.428' 0.437 0.433 0.432' 
[I .92] [ 1.651 [ I .66] [ 1.631 [I .66] 
London (Ord.) 0.1 15 0.128 0.057 0.059 0.0 10 
[0.65] [0.73] [0.32] 10.331 [0.05] 
London (AIM) 0.588' 0.524 0.7 10' 0.71 I* 0.489 
[I .65] [I .46] [ 1.891 1 .a91 [I .32] 
Firm controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs. 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 
0 R' 0.181 0. I 89 0.206 0.2 10 0.222 
to the UKLA Listing Rules with no accommodations. Thus, investors may value 
these firms more highly than firms that are subject to less stringent listing rules. 
Doidge et al. (2009) do not present any pooled or* least squares or firm- 
fixed-effects coefficient estimates for AIM-traded firms. However, Doidge et al. 
(2009) do examine the cross-listing premium in calendar time from 1990 to 2005. 
While they only present data for AIM firms for 2005, the coefficient estimate is 
0.27 (compared to 0.16 for Level 2 and 3 firms), and, although statistically insignif- 
icant, it is consistent with the valuation premia that I document for AIM-traded 
Irish firms. 
Finally, in Table 7, I present coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least 
squares estimates, with unobserved heterogeneity (individual effects) specified as 
time averages of the regressors, an approach advocated by Mundlak (1978) (see 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 719) for a discussion of the issues). In effect, this 
specification is a variant of the firm-fixedeffects model presented in Equation (2). 
The motivation behind estimating this Chamberlain (1984) type model is that the 
firm-fixed estimates presented in Tables 5 and 6 depend crucially upon the 
assumption that strict exogeneity holds. Strid exogeneity implies that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables in all periods. However, 
this is unlikely to be the case given feedback effects from firm value to the cross- 
listing dummy variables. I formally test for this possibility, following Wooldridge 
(2002), by inserting the one-year forwarded cross-listing variables as independent 
variables and testing whether their coefficients are jointly equal to zero. While I 
find that the coefficient estimates are jointly equal to zero, I still proceed to esti- 
mate a model robust to feedback effects. This is because the time-series behaviour 
of Tobin's 4, depicted in Figure 1, suggests that, at least for Level 1 and Level 2 
lists, feedback effects are likely, i.e. the decision to cross-list is in part based on 
past values of Tobin's 4.14 To do so, I estimate a Chamberlain (1984) type model 
and speclfy the individual specific effects as Mundlak (1978) corrections: 
I 
Firmi =KC + a, 9 w h e r e X = - x  X,  , and then proceed to estimate the following: 
T ,I 
value, = a+ PI Level I, + P2Leve12/3, + $, London(Ord),,+ P, London(AIM),,+ p,~,+>Ca + E, (3) 
Equation (3) is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares. Pooled estima- 
tion circumvents the problems associated with violations of the strict exogeneity 
assumption because estimation requires, inter alia, the less restrictive assumption 
of contemporaneous exogeneity. 
In summary, my results suggest the following: cross-listed Irish firms (with 
the exception of Level 1 firxns) tend to be worth more than non-cross-listed Irish 
firms. These 'valuation premia' range from 5.32 to 69.92 per cent, and are largest ' 
for AIM-traded Irish firms. Furthermore, in a series of firm-fixed-effects 
regressions, I find that cross-listing abroad contributes to this premium. On 
average, listing abroad leads to 'within-firm' changes in value in the region of 
1.90, 7.29, 1.88 and 21.61 per cent for Level 1, Level 2, London ((3rd.) and AIM 
traded firms respectively, and 14.93, 19.65, 2.76 and 27.35 per cent using 
market-to-book of assets. In general, using market-to-book of assets, with the 
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TABLE 7: CONTROLLING FOR POSSIBLE FEEDBACK EFFECTS USING 
MUNDLAK'S (1 978) CORRECTION TERMS 
This cable reports coefficient estimates from the following pooled ordinary least squares regressions 
(with Mundlak's (1 978) correction terms): 
q, or mba, = a+p,Level I, +P,LevelZiI+P3London(Ord),,+P,London(AlM), +P,X,, +Fa +E, 
Firm value is measured using Tobin's q, market-t-book of assets (MBA). Level I and Level 2 are dummy 
variables corresponding to a firm's listing in the US. London (Ord.) and London (AIM) are dummy variables 
corresponding to a firm's listing on the London S t d  Exchange either as an ordinary list on the main 
market or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Firm size is measured as the log of annual tales 
in real U S  dollars. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior 
two years. Global industry 9 is cakulated as the average 9 of all global firms within each indusby classifi- 
cation. Firm leverage is total debt to total assets, and protitability is defined as Earnings Before Interest 
and Tawtion (EBIT) -Total Assea. I report t-statistics (absolute value) in square brackea.The t-mtisrics 
are calculated using booatrapped standard errors (200 replications), hereby each replication is a boot- 
svap sample of firm clusren (given the panel nature of the dam). # Obs. is the number of observations 
and R2 is the R-Squared. R > F(Mundlak) tests the joint significance of the included (unreported) Mundlak 
(1 978) time-averaged correction terms. Statistical significance is denoted by "." and for the I, 5 and I0 
per cent levels respectively. 
Tobin's q MBA 
(11 (21 (31 (4) 
Level I 
Level 2 
London (Ord.) 
London (AIM) 
Global q 
Firm growth 
Firm size 
Firm leverage 
Firm profit 
Time dummies 
Firm dummies 
Industry dummies 
# Obs. 
Pr > F(Mundlak) 
R2 
0.069 
[0.49] 
0.142 
[1.19] 
0.0 1 2 
[O. I 51 
0.299' 
11-77] 
0.205 
[ 1.541 
0.853" 
[3.38] 
-0.084" 
[2.10] 
-0.552' 
[I .MI 
0.950" 
[4.75] 
No 
No 
No 
536 
0.000 
0.22 1 
0.680 
[1.17] 
-0.029 
[0.70] 
2.45- 
15.981 
1.25" 
[2.Ml 
No 
No 
Yes 
57 1 
0.000 
0.365 
TABLE 8: ESTIMATES OF VALUATION AND .CROSS-LISTING PREMIA 
BASED O N  TABLES 4.5 A N D  6 
This table reports estimates of the valuation and cross-listing premia for cross-listed Irish firms. 
'Valuation premia' are calculated using coefficient estimates from Table 4.1 estimate the 'cross- 
listing premium' using coefficient estimates from firm-fixed-effects regressions.Table 5 contains 
the estimates for the mean (and median) firm usingTobin's q.Table 6 contains the results using 
market-to-book of assets.'Valuation premia' are calculated as follows: 
value of (average) ncl firm + coefficient estimate (Table 4) 
value of (average) ncl firm 1 * I*. The 'cross-listing premia' are 
coefficient estimae (Table 5 or 6) 
value of (average or median) cl firm * I" (from Tables 5 and 6). Figures in bold 
represent statistically significant premia at conventional levels. 
Table 4: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Using Tobin's q) 
Mean (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level l 1.37 6.94% 9.92% 8.47% 12.58% 6.77% 8.47% 
Level 2 1.40 5.32% 9.35% 8.79% 19.1 1% 14.84% 16.69% 
London (Ord.) 1.66 29.03% 29.60% 28.23% 3 1.29% 30.40% 30.48% 
London (AIM) 2.23 69.92% 64.03% 59.76% 46.53% 5 1.61% 5 1.77% 
Table 5: Firm-Fixed E e c u  (Using Tobin's q) 
Mean finn Mean (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
- - - - - 
Level I 1.37 (7.88%) (3.21%) ( I  .90%) 7.81% 9.05% 7.52% 
Level 2 1.40 10.00% 9.14% 6.29% 4.07% 6.57% 7.64% 
London (Ord.) 1.66 0.18% (0.36%) 0.78% 5.48% 3.43% 1.75% 
London (AIM) 2.23 28.92% 29.46% 25.47% 16.82% 16.50% 12.5 1% 
Median firm Median (I) (21 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level l 1.25 (8.64%) (3.52%) (2.08%) 8.56% 9.92% 8.24% 
Level 2 1.18 1 1.86% 10.85% 7.46% 4.83% 7.80% 9.07% 
London (Ord.) 1.47 0.20% (0.41%) 0.88% 6.19% 3.88% 1.97% 
London(AIM) 1.30 49.62% 50.54% 43.69% 28.85% 28.3 1% 21.46% 
Table 6: Finn-Fixed Efjects (Using Market-to-Book of Assets) 
Mean finn Mean (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Level l 3.04 16.55% 16.91% 13.91% 13.82% 13.45% 
Level 2 2.27 22.03% 18.85% 19.25% 19.07% 19.03% 
London (Ord.) 2.67 4.3 1% 4.79% 2.13% 2.2 1% 0.37% 
London (AIM) 2.2 1 26.6 1 % 23.71 % 32.13% 32.17% 22.13% 
- 
Median firm Median (I) (2) - (3) (4) (5) 
Level I 2.80 17.96% 18.36% 15.1 1% 15.00% 14.61% 
Level 2 2.29 21.83% 18.69% 19.08% 18.91% 18.86% 
London (Ord.) 25 1 4.58% 5.10% 2.27% 2.35% 0.40% 
London(A1M) 1.29 45.58% 40.62% 55.04% 55.12% 37.91% 
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exception of ordinary lists in London, all other cross-listed Irish firms enjoy 
economic and statistically significant cross-listing premia. AIM-traded firms expe- 
rience the greatest gains from listing abroad. This is surprising since these firms 
are subject to the least onerous disclosure and regulatory requirements. In con- 
trast, Level 2 firms, which are subjected to the most stringent disclosure and 
regulatory requirements, enjoy smaller valuation gains from listing abroad. 
Furthermore, Irish firms that trade as ordinary lists on the London Stock 
Exchange, and which are required to provide more comprehensive disclosures 
than AIM-traded firms, do not experience any valuations gains from listing 
abroad. Finally, Level 1 firms enjoy a cross-listing premium, but, in line with the 
results presented by others (see Doidge et al., 2004, 2009), this premium tends to 
be less than that experienced by Level 2 firms. These results suggest that the val- 
uations gains from listing may not necessarily increase in host market investor 
protection, both within and across host markets as predicted by the legal bonding 
hypothesis. 
- 
I Lfltimately, due to data considerations, I am unable to delve further into these 
- results and examine why London (AIM) traded firms enjoy the largest cross- 
7% listing premia. Thus, at present I can only offer some possible explanations. First, 
9% the small cross-listing premia that I document for Level 2 exchange-traded depositary 
8% 
7% receipts may be caused by the fact that this listing did not constitute the firm's initial listing abroad; all of these firms listed in London prior to listing in the US. The find- 
- 
ings of Sarkissian and Schill(2009) suggest that this is a plausible possibility. Second, 
all of the exchange-traded firms in my sample are noncapital-raising Level 2 ADRs, 
- (I as opposed to capital-raising Level 3 depositary receipts. Typically, capital-raising 
!% Level 3 firms enjoy larger cross-listing premia. Finally, Bris, Cantale and Nishiotis 
I% 
i% (2007) show that the economic benefits (as opposed to the statistical sigruficance) 
1 % associated with bonding to a stricter governance regime is small, and smaller than 
- the benefits derived from listing on markets that were previously segmented. 
- 
However, given that one would expect that Ireland is more integrated with the UK 
1% than with the US, I would still have expected that the greatest gains to listing 
'% abroad should have accrued to Irish Level 2 lists. 
'% Furthermore, I am unable to explain why Irish firms that trade on the AIM in 
5% London enjoy the largest cross-listing premia. For now, I am only able to offer 
some possible explanations. First, while the governance requirements of AIM 
- firms is minimal (and thus should lead to a small cross-listing premium as pre- 
- 
dieted by the legal bonding hypothesis and the model outlined in Section 3), the 
typical AIM firm is small (and young), and agency costs are typically low in small 
firms. For these firms, the separation of ownership from control (leading to 
agency costs) is typically minimal, since those who often control these finns are 
typically founding members who retain sizable ownership stakes. As a result, the 
- 
minimal governance requirements may well be sufficiently onerous to ensure that 
- investors hold these firms. In fact, AIM-traded firms have been very successful in 
acquiring capital in London (see Arcot, Black and Owen, 2007; Rousseau, 2003, 
which only serves to lend further credence to this argument. Furthermore, we 
know from the theoretical model outlined in Doidge et al. (2004) that the cross- 
- 
listing premium is increasing wi* firms' growth opportunities. An AIM listing 
81 
provides a pladorm for firms to fund these growth opportunities. Second, the 
costs associated with listing on the AIM market (anhubsequent capital raisings) 
are typically smaller than comparative costs on other exchanges. In fact, many 
firms have cited this as a reason for choosing the AIM market. This is important, 
since many firms have in recent times cited the excessive costs of (initial) listing 
(and subsequent ongoing compliance) as a major reason for delisting from US 
exchanges.15 Hope et al. (2007) theorize that the costs of listing ensure that the 
cross-listing premia experienced by exchange-traded emerging market firms in 
the US are less than those experienced by counterpart developed market firms. 
This line of reasoning then suggests that the cross-listing premia experienced by 
AIM-listed firms may in part be driven by the (low) level of costs associated with 
such a listing. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the relatively small size of the Irish Stock Exchange, it is perhaps not sur- 
prising that Irish firms have tended to list their shares abroad, in order to access 
deep and liquid capital markets. While the absolute number of lists is small, the 
number of Irish firms eligible to list abroad that actually does so is large. In this 
paper, I examine whether doing so is value enhancing. 
The paper is largely motivated by an empirical irregularity outlined in 
Doidge et al. (2004). They outline a theoretical model, which predicts that 
exchange-traded depositary receipts (Levels 2 and 3) should be worth more than 
domestic firms pre-listing, and this 'valuation premiumf should increase after list- 
ing in the US, resulting in a 'cross-listing premium'. However, in 1997, Irish Level 
2 and 3 firms are worth less than non-cross-listed firms. In this paper, I examine 
this issue further. 
Using a panel of Irish firms that trade in the UK or the US over the period 
from 1986 to 2007, I find in a series of pooled least squares and firm-fixedeffect 
regressions that Irish cross-listed firms tend to be worth more, and cross-listing 
contributes to this premium. Specifically, I find that Irish firms are worth more 
than non-cross-listed firms in the region of 5.32 to 69.92 per cent, and this valua- 
tion premium is largest for AIM-traded firms. Furthermore, I find in a series of 
firm-fixedeffects regressions that cross-listing abroad causes an average 'within- 
firm' change in value in the region of 8.17 per cent. Surprisingly, given that 
AIM-traded firms are subject to the least onerous disclosure requirements, these 
firms enjoy the largest valuation gains (average of 21.61 per cent) from listing 
abroad. In contrast, while Level 2 firms are subject to the most stringent and 
demanding disclosure requirements, they experience an average 'within-firm' 
change in value in the region of 7.29 per cent (using market-to-book of assets it is 
a statistically sigruficant 19.65 per cent), which is less than that experienced by 
AIM-traded firms and the average Level 2 or 3 list in the US. In general, Level 1 
firms experience valuation gains from listing abroad, but, consistent with Doidge 
et al. (2004, 2009), they are less than those experienced by Level 2 and 3 lists. 
Finally, listing on the main market of the London Stock Exchange is not value 
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enhancing. Nevertheless, the experience of Irish firms compares favourably with 
the average foreign firm that lists in London. Doidge et al. (2009) uncover a 'cross- 
listing discount' for these firms. These results also suggest that the cross-listing 
premium does not necessarily increase in host market investor protection. While 
I find that Level 2 firms enjoy greater valuation gains from listing in the US rela- 
tive to Level 1 firms, Irish AIM-traded firms do better than ordinary lists on the 
London Stock Exchange. Furthermore, since AIM-traded firms enjoy greater 
valuation gains than Level 2 lists in the US, at least for Irish firms, this suggests 
that the cross-listing premium does not increase with the level of investor protec- 
tion across international equity markets. 
Ultimately, I am unable to delve further into the causes of these results due to 
data restrictions. Nevertheless, I offer some possible explanations. First, it is likely 
that the small cross-listing premia experienced by Level 2 lists are likely to be 
caused by the fact that these firms listed in London prior to listing in the US. 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009) show that a firm's initial international cross-listing 
provides the greatest valuation gains. In the case of AIM-traded firms, the aoss- 
listing premia are likely to be caused by a number of factors, namely, first that the 
governance requirements, albeit minimal, may well be sufficiently onerous for 
investors to hold these firms, since agency costs are likely to be low in these firms. 
In fact, the ability of these firms to raise capital on the AIM lends further credence 
to this argument. Second, the costs of initial and continued listing on the AIM are 
small. Recent evidence suggests that the cross-listing premium is not only a func- 
tion of the benefits derived from listing, but also the costs involved. 
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A relatively new literature examines the reasons why particular international 
exchanges become more attractive to 'international firms' than other competing inter- 
national exchanges. For a recent treatment see Sarkissian and Schill (2008) and 
Femandes and Giannetti (2008). A related Literature examines how the Listing 
(location) preferences of firms differ across corntries (see Pagano, Roell and Zechner, 
2002; Sarkissian and Shill, 2004). 
Doidge et al. (2004) do not report any resulls for Irish firms that trade either over-the- 
counter as Level 1 'pink sheet' issues or as Rule 144a private placements. 
Although included in many multi-country studies, the study of Irish cross-listed firms 
has been largely neglected in academic studies. To the best of my knowledge, Cotter 
(2004) remains the only study that devotes a sizable proportion of his work to the study 
of Irish AD&. Gallagher and Kiely (2005) examine the impact of a dual listing on the 
volume -volatility relationship for 14 Irish firms trading in Dublin and London. Their 
sample of firms includes a number of Irish firms that trade in the US as AD&, but the 
impact of this 'third-listing' is not addressed in their study. Buckland and 
Mulligan (1996) show that Irish firms that list in Landon are, relative to Irish firms that 
list solely on the Irish Stock Exchange, sigruficantly larger and have greater growth 
opporhmities. 
Subsequent work has shown that the cross-listing premium is increasing in both. 
Doidge et al. (2004) show that the cross-listing premium is given by: 
[ ~ ( p ) c - ~ ( ~ ~ , ) ( c + m .  Differentiating with respect to the host level of q=z+---- 
k(l- k) 
Thus, all else being equal, the higher the 'host' level of investor protection, the higher 
the cross-listing premium. 
Using market-to-book of assets the average valuation gains range from 2.76 per cent 
for ordinary lists on the London Stock Exchange to a high of 27.35 per cent for AIM- 
traded firms. The corresponding figures for Level 1 and Level 2 firms are 14.93 and 
- - 
19.65 per cent respectively. 
' However, one might argue that given that many of these Irish firms choose a simulta- 
neous ISE/LSE listing (under the tenns of the ISE/LSE International Stock Exchange 
agreement), a cross-&ting in the US may well have represented these firms' i n i d  
cross-listing. 
One might argue that the inclusion of banking firms may only serve to bias my results 
against finding positive valuation effects from cross-listing. However, recent work 
from Abdallah, Abdallah and Zhu (2009)) found that the market reaction experienced 
by banking firms upon cross-listing in the US appears to be consistent with the 
reaction experienced by the average non-financial cross-listed firm (see Miller, 1999). 
In this regard, banking firms appear to behave no differently than non-financial firms 
upon cross-listing in the US. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for advising 
me to expand o&s issue. 
Firms are designated into one of thirteen industries based on the following classifica- 
tions using Pdigit SIC codes: Agriculture and Food (0100-0999 and 2000-2111); 
Mining and Construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); Textiles and 
Printing/Publishing (2200-2799); Chemicals (2800-2824 and 2840-2899); 
Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); Extractive (2900-2999 and 1300-1399); Durable 
Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); Transportation (4000-4899); Utilities 
(4900-4999); Retail (5000-5999); Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); Computers 
(7370-7379,3570-3579 and 3670-3679); Public Administration (9000+). 
lo In her paper, Salva (2003) examines the valuation effects of cros~listing in the UK using 
standard event study analysis. To make comparisons between my paper and hers, I com- 
pute and graph cumulative abnormal returns (CARS) using the abnormal returns that she 
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reports in Table 3 (Salva, 2003, p. 474) for ordinary lists. The results suggest that 0rdma.t-y 
lists experience a m - u p  in value in the days prior to listing, and fall off thereafter. In each 
of the ten days post-listing, the CARS are lower than those on the list date. 
" Using market-to-book of assets, the average ordinary list experiences an immediate 
increase in value once they cross-list, but value tends to fall below the list year value 
l4 Using both price-toearnings (PE) and enterprise value to EBITDA suggests that this is 
the case for all cross-listing firms (see Figure 2). 
l5 For example, Skyepharma, a UK firm, delisted from the NASDAQ in 2007 due to the 
'expense and burden associated with maintaining compliance with SEC and Nasdaq 
rules' (Healthcare Finance, Tax 6 Law Weekly, 23 May 2007). 
REFERENCES 
Abdallah, A.A.L., Abdallah, W. and Zhu, Y. (2009). The Market Reaction to Banks' 
Overseas Listings: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts, Journal of Financial 
Declsion Making, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 1-20. 
Arcot, S., Black, J. and Owen, G. (2007). From Local to Global. The Rise ofAlM as a StockMarket 
for Growing Companies, report prepared by the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
Bancel, F. and Mittoo, U. (2001). European Managerial Perceptions on the Net Benefits of 
Foreign Stock Listings, European Ftnancial Management, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 213-236. 
Barzuza, M. (2005). Cross-Listing, Asymmetric Information and Private Benefits of Control, 
working paper, Harvard Law School. 
Barzuza, M., Smith, D.C. and Valladares, E. (2006). Signaling a Lemon: The Decision Not to 
Cross-List and High Private Benefits of Control, working paper 74, University of 
Virginia, School of Law. 
Bianconi, M. and Tan, L. (2007). Cross-Listing Premium: Destination US or UK?, workmg 
paper, Northwestern Kellogg School of Management. 
Bris, A., Cantale, S. and Nishiotis, G. (2007). A Breakdown of the Valuation Effects of 
International Cross-Listing, Eumpenn Financial M a n a g m t ,  Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 498-530. 
Buckland, R. and Mulligan, C. (1996). Irish Capital Markets: Segmentation and Provision of 
Secondary Markets, Irish Accountzng Review, Vol. 3, NO. 1, pp. 111-130. 
Cadbury, Sir A. (1992). Report from the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
G u v e m c e ,  London: Gee Publishing. 
Cameron, A.C., Gelbach, J.B. and Miller, D.L. (2007). Bootstrap-Based Improvements for 
Inference with Clustered Errors, Law and Economics Paper No. 07/002, Florida State 
University, College of La*. 
Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. (2005). M~croeconometrics: Methods and Applications, New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Chamberlain, G. (1984). Panel Data, in Z. Griliches and M.D. Intrifigator (eds), Handbook of 
Economeln'cs, Vol. II, pp. 1247-1318, Amsterdam; London: North Holland. 
Claessens, S. and Schmukler, S.L. (2007). International Financial Integration through Equity 
Markets: Which Firms from Which Countries Go Global, Journal of International Money 
and Finance, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 788-813. 
Clarkson, P., Nowland, J. and Ragunathan, V. (2006). Is the Cross-Listing Premium Really 
Related to Investor Protection?, working paper, Queensland University of Technology. 
Cotter, J. (2004). International Equity Market Integration in a Small Open Economy: Ireland 
January 1990-December 2000, International Rmiav of Financial Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 5, 
pp. 669-685. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A. and Stulz, R.M. (2004). Why Are Foreign Finns Listed in the US 
Worth More?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7l, No. 2, pp. 205-238. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A. and Stulz, R.M. (2009). Has New York Become Less Competitive 
in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices Over Time, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 253-277. 
Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R.J. (1986). Bootstrap Measures for Standard Errors, Confidence 
Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy, Statistical Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
pp. 54-77. 
Fernandes, N. and Giannetti, M. (2008). On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their 
Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listing Waves, ECGI finance working paper no. 214. 
Gallagher, L. and Kiely, D. (2005). Volume and GARCH Effects for Dual-Listed Equities: 
Evidence from Irish Equities, Irish Accounting Ratiew, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 63-82. 
Gozzi, J.C., Levine, R. and Schmukler, S.L. (2008). Internationalization and the Evolution of 
Corporate Valuation, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 607-632. 
Hampel, Sir R. (1998). Committee on Corporate Governnnce: Final Report, London: Gee 
Publishing. 
Hope, O., Kang, T. and Zang, Y. (2007). Bonding to the Improved Disclosure Environment 
in the United States: Firms' Listing Choices and their Capital Market Consequences, 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1-33. 
King, M.R. and Segal, D. (2009). The Long-Tern Effects of Cross-Listing, Investor 
Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation, Reuiav of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 
No. 6, pp. 2393 - 2421. 
Li, K. and Prabhala, N.R. (2007). Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance, in B. Espen 
Eckbo (ed), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Amsterdam; 
London: North-Holland. 
Miller, D.P. (1999). The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence from 
Depositary Receipts, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 103-123. 
Mitton, T. and O'Connor, T.G. (2008). Investability and Firm Value, working paper 
N192/05/08, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University 
of Ireland, Maynooth. 
Mundlak, Y. (1978). On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, Economehica, 
Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 69-85. 
Pagano, M., Roell, A.A. and Zechner, J. (2002). The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do 
European Companies List Abroad?, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 6, pp. 2651-2694. 
Petersen, M.A. (2009). Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches, Reuiew of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 435-480. 
Rogers, W. (1993). Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, Stata Technical 
Bulletin, Vol. 13, pp. 19-23, reprinted in STATA Technical Bulletin Reprints, Vol. 3, pp. 
88-94. 
! Salv i Sark 
i 
1 Sark 
1 Sark 
i 
i 
j Whit i 1 
j WOO, 
1 1 E 
I 
The Valuation Effects of Cross-Listing Abroad for Irish Firms 
81 Rousseau, S. (2007). London Calling? The Experience of the Alternative Investment Market )ok of and the Competitiveness of the Canadian Stock Exchanges, Banking and Finance Law 
Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 51-105. 
Pity 
foney Salva, C. (2003). Foreign Listings, Corporate Governance, and Equity Valuations, Iournal of Economics and Business, Vol. 55, Nos. 5-6, pp. 463-485. 
Sarkissian, S. and Schill, M.J. (2004). The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence on 
eally 
logy. Proximity Reference, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 769-808. 
,land Sarkissian, S. and Schill, M.J. (2008). Cross-Listing Waves and the Search for Value Gains, 
10.5, working paper, University of Virginia, Darden School. Sarkissian, S. and Schill, M.J. (2009). Are There Permanent Valuation Gains to Overseas 
e US Listings? Evidence from Market Sequencing and Selection, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, NO. 1, pp. 371-412. 
itive White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
fncial Direct Test of Heteroscedasticity, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 817-838. Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Boston, MA: 
ence MIT Press. 
To. 1, 
heir 
214. 
ities: 
,n of 
Gee 
nent 
a 
nces, 
estor 
1.22, 
spen 
lam; 
from 
aper 
rsity 
trica, 
Y Do 
94. 
ring 
nical 
. PP. 
